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Weinberg: Property

PROPERTY
I.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

In Moultis v. Degen,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that tort victims are required to follow the notice of claim
provisions within section 21-15-6402 in the event their tortfeasor
dies. The court also took advantage of Moultis as its first opportunity to denominate section 21-15-640, a nonclaim statute.3 The
significance of that appellation will depend on whether the
court, in future decisions, recognizes a distinction between nonclaim statutes and statutes of limitation. The Moultis decision
was not arrived at without difficulty, however. The majority's
original opinion was not only accompanied by a vigorous dissent," but was also deemed worthy of a second look by the court.
The appellant was granted a rehearing after the initial opinion
was filed July 29, 1982.5 While the original holding was not
changed in its second opinion, handed down March 24, 1983, the
court added obitur dictum not found in its first effort." According to this dictum tardy claimants of a decedent may pursue the
undistributed assets of the decedent's estate despite the strictures of section 21-15-640. 7

1.

-

S.C.

-,

301 S.E.2d 554 (1983).

2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-640 (1976) reads:
All claims of creditors of such estate shall upon the expiration of five
months after the first publication of the notice prescribed in § 21-15-630 be
forever barred unless, before the expiration of such period, an account thereof,
duly attested, shall have been filed with such executor or administrator or with
the judge of probate of the county in which such estate is being administered.
But the provisions of this section shall not apply to obligations secured by
mortgages or other liens which have been duly recorded prior to the expiration
of such period.
3. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 556. Nonclaim statutes "generally provide that 'all
claims' should be presented to the executor or administrator, or filed in the court, and if
not so presented or filed within a stated period, they shall forever be barred." Annot., 22
ALR3d 493, 496 (1968)(footnotes omitted).
4. The dissent by Justice Ness was joined by Chief Justice Lewis. Moultis v. Degan,
No. 21770, 24 Smith Advance Sheet 9, 11 (1982).
5. Moultis v. Degan, No. 21770, 26 Smith Advance Sheet (reh'g granted) (1982).
6. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 558. See infra note 47.
7. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 558.
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In Moultis, the appellant was administratrix of the estate of
Carol A. Wludyka. Ms. Wludyka succumbed to an illness on
July 9, 1973, after she had received treatment from several physicians.8 Shortly thereafter, Dr. J.M. Davis, one of the doctors

who had attended Ms. Wludyka, also died. In 1979, appellant
brought wrongful death 9 and survival actions against the doctors involved in Ms. Wludyka's unsuccessful treatment." Among
the named defendants were the executors of Dr. Davis' estate,
including the doctor's widow, who was also named individually
as sole beneficiary of the estate. 2 Mrs. Davis interposed a demurrer on the ground that section 21-15-640 bars tort claims
against the assets of an estate if such claims are not filed within
the five month period described by the statute. The trial judge
sustained the demurrer." Appellant claimed that this decision
was error, insisting that neither tort victims nor their representatives are "creditors" and that a cause of action in tort is not a
"claim" within the meaning of section 21-15-640.14
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected appellant's interpretation of the statute. For the proposition that a "claim" in
the context of the statute includes tort claims, the court cited an
article in American Law Reports, Third Edition,which said that
nonclaim statutes using the words "claim" or "all claims" have
generally been held to include tort claims within their meaning,
although some jurisdictions hold otherwise. 5 The majority characterized this passage as stating a general rule, which rule it proceeded to adopt.1 6 In its analysis of "creditor," the court cited to
Corpus Juris Secundum which states that the term "creditor"
has generally been held to include tort claimants in the context
of remedial statutes. 17 The court also quoted from the opinion of
an Ohio Court of Common Pleas which broadly defined "creditor" as including, inter alia, a tort claimant.18
8. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 558.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (1976).
10. Id. at §§ 15-5-80, -90 (1976).
11. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557.
12. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557.
13. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557; Record at 38.
14. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557; Record at 40.
15. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557 (quoting Annot., 22 ALR 3d 493, 496 (1968)).
16. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557.
17. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557 (citing 21 C.J.S. Creditorat 1050 (1940)).
18. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557 (citing Coronet Mfg. Corp. v. May Furniture
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To further bolster the notion that tort victims are "creditors," the court recalled its recent decision in Bonsall v. Piggly
Wiggly Helms, Inc.19 In that case the plaintiff was the victim of
a slip and fall accident in defendant's grocery store. The plaintiff discussed the accident with a store employee the same day
and later with an adjuster of defendant's insurance company.20
Not long after the accident took place, the defendant instituted
corporate dissolution proceedings. Section 33-21-60(b) of the
South Carolina Code required the defendant to notify all
"known creditors" of its intention to dissolve. 1 Plaintiff was not
notified of the dissolution and did not file a cause of action on
her tort claim until more than two years had passed. 22 Defendant attempted to quash service on the theory that plaintiff's
claim was barred by the two year limitation section 33-21-220
erects against claimants of dissolved companies.2 3 The South
Carolina Supreme Court unanimously held that plaintiff was a
"known creditor" of defendant by virtue of her tort claim and
the corporation's knowledge of that claim.24 Her claim was

Co., 31 Ohio Misc. 131, 282 N.E.2d 588 (1971)).
The dissent in Moultis asserts that the word "creditor" has a narrower meaning. In
construing the term "creditor" as used within § 21-15-640, the dissent urges that a party
cannot be a creditor of an estate unless a debt can be identified. Justice Ness cites Wallace v. Timmons, 232 S.C. 311, 101 S.E.2d 844 (1958), and, quoting that case, said:
"[Tihis Court stated that § 19-474 (1956) recodified as § 21-15-640, Code of Laws of
South Carolina (1976), refers to 'claims of creditors, and relate(s) to debts of the testator
payable from his estate."' - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 559 (emphasis added Ness, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also argued that a tort claim does not create a debt in the
wrongdoer unless and until the tort victim adjudicates the claim in court and a judgment
is returned for payment in favor of the victim. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 559.
19. Bonsall v. Piggly Wiggly Helms, Inc., 275 S.C. 593, 274 S.E.2d 298 (1981).
20. Id. at 595, 274 S.E.2d at 299.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-60(g)(1976).
22. 275 S.C. at 594-95, 247 S.E.2d at 298-99.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-22 (1976).
24. 275 S.C. at 596, 274 S.E.2d at 299. Justice Ness claims that the court's interpretation of the term "known creditor" in Bonsall is of no moment when one attempts to
discover the scope of "creditor" in § 21-15-640. He points out that not only are there two
different statutes involved but that each statute has "patently dissimilar ...objectives."
S.C. at

-,

301 S.E.2d at 560 (Ness, J., dissenting).

The objectives behind § 21-15-640 and those behind § 33-21-60, while not identical,
do not appear to be dissimilar. The former seeks to wind up the affairs of decedents,
while the latter seeks to wind up the affairs of corporations. Nevertheless, the fact that
no debt was owed by the defendant to plaintiff in Bonsall does not trouble Justice Ness
as it does in Moultis. See supra note 18. Apparently, he believes one can be a creditor
without a debt in some cases but not in others.
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therefore still valid against the corporation because she did not
receive the notice to which she was entitled under section 33-2160(b). 25
Additionally, the court in Moultis observed that section 2115-640 contained exemptions for specified claims. It then reasoned that any claims not specifically exempted were intended
by the legislature to fall within the ambit of the statute, and
that "[a]ny further exemptions must be legislative determinations. '26 Thus, through its interpretation of the statute's intended scope as well as its construction of the statute's wording,
the court concluded that tort victims are subject to the notice of
claim provisions mandated by section 21-15-640.
In addition to concluding that section 21-15-640 applies to
tort claimants, the supreme court held that this provision is a
nonclaim statute. While its resolution of the former issue is susceptible to debate, the court's latter determination is unquestionably accurate. The basic provisions of section 21-15-640 were
initially added to the 1942 version of the South Carolina Code in
1943.27 Prior to that enactment, the South Carolina Supreme
Court had interpreted South Carolina law as protecting only the
personal representatives of estates against the untimely filing of
creditors' claims 28 and had ruled that South Carolina did not
have a nonclaim statute.2" The Fourth Circuit apparently relying
on these pre-1943 decisions misinterpreted 21-15-640's predecessor in Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Wilson,"0 and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina utilized Moultis to set the

25. 275 S.C. at 596, 274 S.E.2d at 299.
26. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557.
27. With some differences the provision was amended as subsection (b) to § 8993 of
the 1942 South Carolina Code. In 1952, § 8993(G) was recodified as § 19-474 of the Code.
For an excellent analysis of the history of § 21-14-640, see Judge Blatt's opinion in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fagan, 459 F. Supp. 933, 935, 939 (D.S.C. 1978). See also 1964
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1777 at 297; Karesh, Wills-Survey of South Carolina Law, 8
S.C.L.Q. 150, 162 (1955).
28. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 556. The court cites two cases that interpreted
South Carolina law (specifically the predecessor of S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-640 (1976)) as
extending protection only to the personal representatives of estates. When a tardy creditor sought redress against the estate, he could still pursue the identifiable assets of the
estate in the hands of distributees. The two cases cited by the court are McNair v.
Howls, 123 S.C. 252, 116 S.E. 279 (1923), and Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette,
168 S.C. 272, 167 S.E. 465 (1932).
29. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 556 (citing McNair, 116 S.E. at 285).
30. Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 213 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1954).
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record straight. 31 In doing so, the court agreed with the late Professor Coleman Karesh 32 and the South Carolina Attorney General3 s "that the legislature has expressed its intent that this
''3 4
state should have a nonclaim provision.
While it is worth noting that the South Carolina Supreme
Court has determined it was the legislature's intention to provide South Carolina with a nonclaim provision, the extent to
which a nonclaim provision differs from a statute of limitations
in South Carolina is a question that can only be answered
through future litigation. In many jurisdictions, important distinctions are made between the two. 35 For instance, a nonclaim
statute is said to create a condition precedent to the enforcement of a right of action, for if the claim is not filed within the
specified time period it is forever barred. 6 Thus, if a nonclaim
statute bars a claim, it deprives an otherwise appropriate court
of its jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.37 Additionally, it is

31. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557 n.2. The court discusses Judge Blatt's critical
analysis of the Dubuque decision in Fagan,supra note 27 and Professor Karesh's early
criticism of the same case in 8 S.C.L.Q. 162 (1955). The Dubuque court was apparently
misled by an annotator's error in the 1952 S.C. Code which mistakenly associated the
McNair and Columbia Theological Seminary decisions with the 1952 version of § 21-15640. The decisions allowed tardy creditors to recover against distributed assets of an
estate, and the Dubuque court's opinion was consistent with their holdings. That court
apparently did not realize it was construing 1943 code provisions with cases decided in
1923 and 1932. Fagen, 459 F. Supp. at 937; Karesh, 8 S.C.L.Q. at 164.
32. See supra notes 27, 31.
33. See supra notes 27, 31.
34. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 556.
35. For a concise and illuminating discussion of the topic, see Comment, Executors
and Administrators-Comparisonof Nonclaim Statutes and General Statutes of Limitations, 36 MICH. L. REv. 973 (1938).
36. Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981); Chicago & North Western Ry. v.
City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Iowa 1970); Beacon Mut. Indem. Co. v. Stalder, 120
N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ohio 1954); Estate of Minton v. Markham, 625 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tenn.
1981)(Brock, J., dissenting). See also Turner v. Estate of Lo Shee Pang, 631 P,2d 1010,
1011 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)(noting that "compliance with [the nonclaim statute's] requirements is essential for recovery").
37. Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 453 F. Supp. 967, 976 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493, 498 (N.D.I. 1966); Daigle,634 P.2d at 75; State v.
Hall, 358 S.W.2d 845, 848, 849 (Mo. 1962); Clark v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Mo.
1959); Beacon Mut. Indem. Co., 120 N.E.2d at 745. See also Greyhound Lines v. Lexington State Bank and Trust, 604 F.2d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1979)(a claims barring statute,
since repealed, operated as jurisdictional limitation on state courts, though not federal);
In Re Brown's Estate, 117 So.2d 478, 481 (Fla. 1960)("where no exemption from the
provisions of a statute [of nonclaim] exist the court is powerless to create one."); 31 Am.
JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators§§ 270, 291, 293 (1967).
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beyond anyone's power either to waive3 8 the provision's effect or
toll it.39 By contrast, a statute of limitations can be voluntarily
waived or tolled, 40 and in many jurisdictions the defense which

such a statute provides is considered waived by the defendant if
41
not affirmatively pled.
The Moultis case very nearly presented an issue which
would have allowed the court to hear arguments regarding such
distinctions. The trial court sustained Mrs. Davis' demurrer on
the ground that section 21-15-640 barred plaintiff's claim against
her as the sole beneficiary of her husband's estate. 42 In a footnote, the supreme court observed that "the claims barring statute is an affirmative defense to be pled by way of answer, and
hence is not a ground for a demurrer. '4s The court went on to
say that because the point was not raised on appeal it would not

be considered. 44 Is it clear, however, that the defendant must assert a nonclaim statute as an affirmative defense when the plaintiff has been deprived of his right of action by not complying

with the requirements of the statute? If a nonclaim statute does
create a condition precedent to a right of action, and if, when

that condition is not met, the statute operates to deprive a court
of its jurisdiction over the matter, then it would appear that a
demurrer is an appropriate response to the complaint which asserts a barred claim."5 Indeed, the very purpose of the statute is

38. Daigle, 634 P.2d at 75; Hall, 358 S.W.2d at 849; Beacon Mut. Indem. Co., 120
N.E.2d at 745; Turner, 631 P.2d at 1011; Estate of Lecic v. Lane Co., 104 Wis. 2d 592,
603, 312 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1981).
39. Daigle, 634 P.2d at 75.
40. Id.
41. Id. See also Estate of Minton, 625 S.W.2d at 265 (Brock, J., dissenting).
42.

-

S.C. at

-,

301 S.E.2d at 557.

43. Id. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 557 n.3. For this proposition the court cited Ellett Bros.
v. Manos, 269 S.C. 581, 239 S.E.2d 75 (1977). In Ellett Bros., the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a lower court's decision to sustain the defendant's demurrer. The
supreme court observed that it must review the allegations stated in the complaint and
assume them to be true when deciding if sufficient facts were asserted in the complaint
to constitute a cause of action. The court then added that it would not consider any
affirmative defenses that the respondent might have been able to assert. The court did
not make clear which, if any, affirmative defenses the respondent was not entitled to
have considered. Id. at 583, 239 S.E.2d at 75.
44. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 551 n.3.
45. In Moultis, the respondent listed 12 grounds to support her amended demurrer,
one of which asserted the bar raised by § 21-15-640. Record at 29-30. In South Carolina a
defendant may demur when it appears on the face of the complaint that, inter alia,
"[Tihe court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the
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to "forever bar" those claims proscribed by its terms, and it is
this finality which primarily distinguishes a nonclaim statute
from a statute of limitations.
In holding that section 21-15-640 is a nonclaim statute and
that tort claimants are subject to its provisions, the supreme
court resolved the controversy presented by Moultis. Yet, in
contradiction to the underlying reasoning of its holdings, the

court added dictum which states that although the court holds
tardy tort claims barred by the statute, "this holding does not
apply to undistributed assets ....
,,4 The clear purpose of this
4
7
dictum is to allow tort victims to reach, via suits against ad-

ministrators de bonis non, the liability insurance coverage of the

deceased. 48 The court reasoned that since "it is appropriate to
petition the probate court to reopen the estate in order that after-discovered assets may be accumulated and distributed
S. ., and since "a liability insurance policy. . . [is] an undistributed asset of the estate," 50 a tort claimant who did not corn-

action." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-320 (1976). The appellant's amended complaint recited
that Dr. Davis was deceased, that the assets of his estate had been distributed, that the
estate had been closed, and that the executors had been discharged. Record at 5-6. Thus,
without the additional assertion that appellant had complied with the condition precedent required by § 21-15-640 (filing her attested claim in the prescribed manner), it
would appear from the face of the complaint that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the cause of action, or alternatively, that insufficient facts were asserted to state a cause
of action. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-320(6)(1976).
See also Donnally v. Montgomery County Welfare Board, 92 A.2d 354 (Md. 1952), in
which the court said that "[w] hile it is generally held that a statute of limitations must
be specially pleaded. . . the reason for the rule is inapplicable to a non-claim statute."
Id. at 357.
46. - S.C. at -,
301 S.E.2d at 558.
47. The court's approach in allowing late creditors to pursue the undistributed assets of a deceased must be considered dictum. As the court itself points out, the "ruling
does not comfort this particular appellant." S.C. at -,
301 S.E.2d at 539.
48. Id. at -,
301 S.E.2d at 539. This result appears to be the sole policy objective
of the court although its reasoning would produce broader results. See infra note 53 and
accompanying text.
49. S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 558 (citing Anderson v. Bowers, 117 F. Supp. 584
(D.S.C. 1954); McNair v. Howle, 123 S.C. 252, 116 S.E. 279 (1923)). The Anderson court
was concerned with the reopening of an estate in a tax case. The discharged executrix
had received an excessive commission from the estate before it was closed and there was
a question of whether she was obliged to return the funds to the estate. No tardy creditor was involved, and § 21-15-640 was not mentioned.
McNair, as the court itself noted elsewhere in the opinion, was decided long before §
21-15-640 came into existence. See supra note 30-31 and accompanying text.
50. - S.C. at -,
301 S.E.2d at 558 (citing In re Miles Estate, 262 N.C. 647, 138
S.E.2d 487 (1964); Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 492 P.2d 219
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ply with the nonclaim statute should be able to petition the probate court to appoint an administrator de bonis non, thereby
giving the tort claimant a party to sue. 1 The next step in the
court's suggested procedure requires the administrator de bonis
non to involve the insurance company so that it may "afford the
protection for which a premium was paid." 2
The court's reasoning permits not only late tort claimants
but noncomplying contract creditors to avail themselves of this
procedure.5 3 Such an opportunity would present itself if the undistributed asset turned out to be something other than a liability insurance policy. Thus, potential distributees who wish to
(1971)). In Miles, the court considered the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute
that specifically precluded tardy claimants from pursuing assets paid out by an administrator. Undistributed assets were therefore exempt from the statute's operation. 262 N.C.
at 654-55, 138 S.E.2d at 492-93.
The Belancsik court was also dealing with a statutory scheme different from South
Carolina's. In that decision, the court was asked to decide if the following statutory language denied equal protection: "The four-month time limitation for serving and filing of
claims [against an estate] shall not accrue to the benefit of any liability or casualty insurer as to claims against the deceased. . . ." 80 Wash. 2d at 113, 492 P.2d at 220. The
question was not one of judicially creating an exemption to a nonclaim statute, but
whether a legislatively created exemption was constitutional. The court held that it was.
51. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting Williams v. Grossman, 409 Mich. 67,
293 N.W.2d 315 (1980)). The Williams court was also dealing with a statutory scheme
significantly different from South Carolina's because the statute in question lacked the
"forever barred" language of typical nonclaim statutes. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §
700.732 (1980). The Michigan court, however, termed the statute in question a nonclaim
provision. 409 Mich. at 86, 293 N.W.2d at 321. The court in Williams concluded that the
Michigan statutory scheme merely precludes tardy creditors from filing claims against an
estate, but allows claims to be made directly against a decedent's personal representative
to reach a liability insurance policy, which the court found not to be part of the probated
estate. Id. at 83-85, 293 N.W.2d at 320.
52. - S.C. at -, 301 S.E.3d at 558. The insured's purpose in obtaining coverage
and paying the associated premiums is most likely to be the protection of his assets
against liability claims. The Moultis case illustrates an instance in which the purpose
behind the premiums being paid no longer existed, for the assets were out of reach.
While the court's view of the premium's purpose may differ from that of the insured, it is
those who are insured who must pay the increased premiums that result when the court
extends liability.
At least one court, when faced with a situation and statute similar to that in Moultis, has declined to adopt the procedures embraced by the South Carolina Supreme
Court. In Swan v. Estate of Monette, 265 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 400 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1968), the court said that "neither the plaintiffs nor anyone else may proceed against the liability carrier of a deceased until they have complied
with the nonclaim statutes." 265 F. Supp. at 366.
53. Because the court has subsumed tort claimants under the term "creditor," it
follows that any procedures open to tardy tort claimants are equally applicable to contract creditors who have not filed within the required period of time.
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have after-discovered assets54 administered run the risk of competing with tardy contract creditors (as well as "barred" tort
claimants) if they petition the probate court to reopen the
estate.
When the court found the appellant in Moultis to be within
the ambit of 21-15-640, it observed that only the legislature
could create further exemptions to the statute's bar. The court's
deference to the legislature proved to be short-lived. Its assertion that creditors whose claims are barred by 21-15-640 might
nevertheless pursue the undistributed assets of an estate is in
obvious contradiction to the statute's language. The nonclaim
provision clearly states that noncomplying creditors are forever
barred from raising their claims and no distinction is made
among the assets of the deceased. Furthermore, the statute's bar
does not act upon the assets of the estate, it acts upon the
claims of noncomplying creditors. It is no more within the
court's purview to say that certain classifications of a deceased's
assets are unaffected by 21-15-640 than it is within its authority
to exempt particular categories of creditors. The statute is a
nonclaim provision, as the court emphatically recognized, and
the bar it erects may not properly be dismantled by the court,
unless it finds constitutional grounds to do so.
The court's opinion in Moultis is important in several respects. First, it recognized 21-15-640 as a nonclaim statute. The
full importance of this holding will ultimately depend on the extent a nonclaim statute is distinguished from statutes of limitations in future decisions. Second, the court held that tort victims
are creditors within the meaning of 21-15-640. This is an issue
on which other jurisdictions have divided55 and one which sepa-

54. The question of what constitutes an undistributed asset is also raised. It is clear
that the court would like tort victims to be able to reach the liability insurance policies
of their tortfeasor without the hindrance of § 21-15-640. But the court's statement is
broader; it permits the "aggrieved plaintiff to pursue the insurance policy and other undistributed assets." - S.C. at , 301 S.E.2d at 558 (emphasis supplied). Certainly the
court is not suggesting that while an estate is being administered and assets have yet to
be distributed, tardy creditors may attempt to satisfy their claims out of these assets.
That approach would effectively eviscerate § 21-15-640. It is apparent the court intended
only that assets which are discovered after the estate has been closed be vulnerable to
these claims. The court does not explain the basis on which it distinguishes these assets
from those that were known during the estate's administration, nor how any distinction
might serve to resuscitate a theretofor expired claim.
55. See, e.g., Moore v. Stephens, 84 So. 2d 752, 760 (Ala. 1956); Spencer v. Marshall,
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rated members of the Moultis court as well. Given the persuasive arguments and policies found on both sides of the question,
the supreme court could have supported either position. In deciding as it did the court simply exercised its authority to interpret ambiguous statutory language.
The court should have stopped there, as indeed it had in its
original opinion of July 1982. But it did not, and on the basis of
cases decided against different statutory backgrounds the court
went on, in dictum, to circumvent 21-15-640's strict requirements. It did so, one must believe, because of reservations held
among its members in allowing insurance companies to benefit
while tort victims went uncompensated. The scheme it devised,
or at least the intended result, is not unique.8 What is unusual
is its implementation by judicial decision rather than through
legislative action.
Marquard H. Lund, III
II.

FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE IN GRANTING CLAUSE CONTROLS
ESTATE CONVEYED

In Shealy v. South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co.,57 the South

Carolina Supreme Court, following the South Carolina rule on
construction of deeds, held that if the granting clause of a deed
conveys a fee simple absolute title, limitations in the following
paragraph that diminish the interest granted are void. South
Carolina continues to adhere to this technical rule, which is followed by a very small minority of jurisdictions."" The court in
Shealy also ruled that the heirs of the grantor, who had actual
and constructive notice of the deed, were not entitled to equitable compensation for improvements made on the land after the
deed was executed. 9
218 A.2d 387, 388 (Conn. 1965). See generally, Annot., 22 ALR 3d 493, 499 (1968), but
cf. Id. at 501 (which discusses nonclaim statutes in which "claim" and "all claims" have
been held not to include tort victims).
56. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(f)(Burns Cum. Supp. 1983); UNIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 3-803(c)(2)(1969).
57. 278 S.C. 132, 293 S.E.2d 306 (1982).
58. See generally, Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 1378 (1958). For cases supporting the majority rule, see, e.g., Swearingen v. McGee, 303 Ky. 825, 198 S.W.2d 805 (1946); Hutchinson
v. Board, 194 Tenn. 223, 250 S.W.2d 82 (1952).
59. 278 S.C. at 137, 293 S.E.2d at 308.
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In 1927 Frank Shealy conveyed a tract of land to Lexington
Water and Power Company, South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company's predecessor in interest 6 The first paragraph of the
deed effectively created a fee simple absolute estate, and was
followed by a description of the property. After the property
description and preceding the habendum and warranty clauses,
a series of four paragraphs reserved to the grantor certain rights
pertaining to the property, including the right of the grantor, his
heirs and assigns to possession and control until possession was
required for the "purpose" of the grantee, its successors and
assigns.6 1
The Shealy family moved onto the property in 1928 and
made various improvements to it over the years.6 2 When the
Shealys unsuccessfully attempted to claim title to the land by
adverse possession in 1969, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company claimed it needed the land for its "purpose." The lower
court construed the term "purpose" to mean the impounding of
water for hydroelectric development, a necessity which had not
yet arisen, and allowed the Shealys to maintain possession and
control of the land." On appeal, however, the supreme court reversed on the grounds that the "purpose" clause retaining possession and control of the property in the grantor was void, and
that the grantee had held a fee simple absolute title to the property since 1927.64
South Carolina follows the technical rule of construction of
a deed that "[w]here the granting clause in a deed purports to
convey a fee simple absolute title, subsequent provisions of the
deed cannot diminish that granted or deprive the grantee of the
incidents of ownership in the property."6 5 The court in Shealy

60. Id. at 134, 293 S.E.2d at 307. In 1943 South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

(S.C.E.&G.) acquired Lexington Water and Power Company's rights in the property
through a merger. Record at 120.
61. Record at 96-99.
62. 278 S.C. at 135, 293 S.E.2d at 308. At least one member of the Shealy family

lived on the land and controlled it until the court's decision in 1982. Id., 293 S.E.2d at
308. The improvements included an airplane runway, an airplane hanger, chicken
houses, and a causeway from the main property to an adjacent island. Record at 174.
63. Record at 181-82.
64. 278 S.C. at 136, 293 S.E.2d at 308-09.

65. Id. at 135, 293 S.E.2d at 308 (emphasis by court). This rule has long been followed in South Carolina. See, e.g., Ingram v. Porter, 7 S.C. Eq. (4 McCord Eq.) 198, 200
(1827).
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did not elaborate on the reasons for this rule, but merely applied
it as it had in similar cases in the past."'
The original purpose of the habendum clause was to define
the interest granted.6 7 The premises clause of the deed, which is
defined as all that is contained in the deed before the habendum,6e gradually took over the habendum's function by specifying the estate granted in addition to naming the grantor and
grantee and describing the property. Thus, the habendum became redundant. The courts developed the rule that when the
terms of the habendum were repugnant to or irreconcilably in
conflict with the grant already made in the premises, the habendum was void.6 In the early South Carolina decisions applying
this rule, the court used the term "premises. 7 0 Gradually, however, the name given in South Carolina to that part of a deed
which precedes the habendum.
changes from the "premises" to
71
the "granting clause.

In Shealy, the "purpose" clause retaining possession and
control of the land in the grantor preceded the habendum. Thus,
according to the traditional definition of premises, the "purpose" clause appeared in the premises. In view of the reason behind the rule of construction-to resolve conflicts between the
premises and the habendum-the Shealy deed did not present
an appropriate circumstance in which to apply it because the
apparent conflict in that deed was contained in the premises
alone. 2
The court's application of the rule in Shealy and other cases

66. See, e.g., County of Abbeville v. Knox, 267 S.C. 38, 225 S.E.2d 863 (1976);
Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46 (1968).
67. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 468; R.NORTON, A TREATISE ON
DEEDS 306-07; (R. MORRISON & H. GOOLDEN (2d ed. 1981)).
68. R. DEVLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DnRS § 176 (1887); R. NORTON, supra
note 53, at 306.
69. 4 J. KENT, supra note 53, at 468; See Ratliff v. Marrs, 87 Ky. 26, 7 S.W. 395
(1888).
70. See, e.g., Ingram v. Porter, 7 S.C. Eq. (4 McCord Eq.) 198, 200 (1827).
71. To support its application of the rule in Wilson v. Poston, 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E.
849 (1924), the court cited numerous authorities, some of which had used the terms
"granting clause" and "premises" interchangeably. See also Rhodes v. Black, 170 S.C.
193, 202, 170 S.E. 158, 161 (1933); Glasgow v. Glasgow, 222 S.C. 322, 327, 70 S.E.2d 432,
433-34 (1952)("premises" and "granting clause" used interchangeably).
72. But see, e.g., Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46 (1968)(deed
structure similar to Shealy deed; restricting clause appearing before the habendum, but
held ineffectual).
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in which the conflict is found solely within the premises may be
grounded on other reasoning. One explanation is that the court
may consider the actual granting clause to be only a part of the
premises."3 This technical rule of construction could then apply
to conflicts between the granting clause and any subsequent part
of the deed, which could include another part of the premises.
Another explanation is that this South Carolina rule was
adopted not because of the changing nature of the premises and
the habendum, but arose instead from the rule that in solving
conflicts within a deed, that which comes first prevails over that
which comes later.74 If either of these explanations is accurate,
then the rule was correctly applied in Shealy.
When the technical rule is applied to resolve apparent conflicts among different parts of a deed, the deed is broken down
into its formal or technical parts and the granting clause controls its interpretation. The majority of jurisdictions, however,
follow the modern rule and resolve apparent conflicts in a deed
by considering the entire document as a whole to determine the
grantor's intent.7 5 An application of the modern rule is more
likely to give effect to the agreement that the parties intended to
make than is an application of the technical rule.76 If, for example, it is clear from the entire deed that the grantor intended a
term in the habendum to prevail over a seemingly conflicting
term in the granting clause, an application of the modern rule
would fulfill this intention while adherence to the technical rule
would defeat it.77 The technical rule is an arbitrary rule of construction"8 and should only be applied when the grantor's inten19
tions cannot be determined from the instrument as a whole.
Besides defeating the grantor's intention, an application of
the technical rule is often inequitable. In the present case, as in
many cases where this rule is applied, the grantee received an
interest not bargained for and the grantor was deprived of an

73. This reasoning would make it difficult to explain the court's use of the two terms
interchangeably.
74. See Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Co., 79 S.C. 166, 169, 60 S.E. 445, 446
(1907). If this were true, there would be no need for the "granting clause" rule.
75. See supra note 44.
76. Pike v. Menz, 358 Mo. 1035, 1043, 218 S.W.2d 575, 579 (1949).
77. See Seawell v. Hall, 185 N.C. 80, 83, 116 S.E. 189, 191 (1923).
78. Bronstein v. Bronstein, 83 So.2d 669, 700 (Fla. 1955).
79. See Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 690, 709 (1881).
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interest expressly reserved.8 0 If the modern rule had been applied in this case, the Shealys would have remained in possession and control of the property until it was needed by the
grantee for its "purpose," which is what the parties intended
when the deed was drafted.
Despite the problems associated with the technical rule, it
has a long history of support in South Carolina. Given the rule's
history and its reaffirmance in Shealy, the court is unlikely to
abandon it in the near future. The practitioner must be aware of
the rule and avoid this problem when drafting deeds.8 1
The court in Shealy also held that the heirs of the grantor
were not entitled to equitable compensation for improvements
to the land after the deed was recorded. In denying compensation, the court reasoned that the Shealys had both actual and
constructive knowledge of South Carolina Electric & Gas's deed;
they admitted that they knew of the 1927 deed from Frank
Shealy, and the deed was properly recorded. The Shealys, therefore, could have no bona fide belief that they were true owners
of the property, a prerequisite to the equitable right to compensation for improvements."2
The court clearly ruled correctly on this issue. It should be
pointed out, however, that while the Shealys were not entitled to
the enhanced value of the property due to their improvements,
they might have been allowed to take those improvements that
were readily removable.8 3 This conclusion is supported by the
fact that the deed expressly reserved that right to them."
Shealy offers no real surprises to the South Carolina practitioner. It does, however, serve as a reminder that the South Car-

80. Carter Oil v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 657, 192 S.W.2d 215, 219 (1946).
81. One solution to the problem is to use a deed-back. A conveys to B a fee simple
absolute. B conveys back to A a defeasible fee in a subsequent deed. In the present case,
Lexington Water and Power Company would have conveyed to Shealy a fee simple subject to the condition subsequent that if the land was needed for the impounding of
water, the. title reverted to Lexington Water and Power Company.
82. 278 S.C. at 136, 293 S.E.2d at 308-09. Nor could the South Carolina betterments
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-27-10 (1976) have aided the Shealys in their argument because it also requires a good faith belief on the part of the improver that he had good
title to the property. Moreover, the betterments statute is designed to compensate a
defendant who does not prevail in a dispute over title to land rather than plaintiffs like
the Shealys.
83. See generally 41 AM. Jun. 2d Improvements § 3 (1968).
84. Record at 99.
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olina Supreme Court continues to adhere to an extremely technical rule of deed construction, justifying their decisions by
relying on precedent without examining the reasons behind that
precedent. Until the court indicates that it is willing to reconsider its position, the practitioner should strictly observe the established deed formulas.
Lawrence J. Scott
III.

MORTGAGES: THIRD PARTY INTERESTS SUBJECT TO PRIOR

PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE

In McElveen v. Brunson," the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a building erected on mortgaged land by a conditional vendor at the request of the mortgagor was subject to
the purchase money mortgage on the land, notwithstanding an
attempt by the vendor to retain title to the building by an agreement with the mortgagor."6 Under McElveen, title retention
agreements between conditional vendors and mortgagors are ineffective against a prior mortgage on the land unless the mortgagee consents to the agreement.
McElveen conveyed a tract of land to Brunson, who made a
down payment and granted a purchase money mortgage to
McElveen to secure the balance of the purchase price. The mortgage, which was recorded, covered the "land with any and all
improvements thereon ....
,,87 Subsequently, Brunson asked
Stanley Smith & Sons, Inc. (Smith) to construct a building on
the land. Smith secured the purchase price of the building with
a mechanic's lien and an agreement with Brunson stating that
title to the building would be retained by Smith as a mortgagee
of personal property.88
When Brunson defaulted on both obligations, McElveen instituted foreclosure proceedings on the land and the building.
Smith also claimed entitlement to the building.89 The master
found that the building was "permanent in nature" 90 and sub-

85. 277 S.C. 414, 289 S.E.2d 152 (1982).
86. Id. at 415, 289 S.E.2d at 152-53.

87. Record at 5.
88. 277 S.C. at 415, 289 S.E.2d at 152.
89. Id. at 415, 289 S.E.2d at 152.
90. Record at 91.
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ject to McElveen's mortgage. 9 1The circuit court disagreed, holding that the agreement between Smith and Brunson controlled. 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding no consent
by McElveen to the agreement between Smith and Brunson, and
that the building was subject to McElveen's prior mortgage.9 3
The supreme court cited Gilbert v. Easterling94 for the general rule that "where improvements, which become a part of the
freehold are put upon the mortgaged premises, either by the
mortgagor or a purchaser from him, such improvements become
subject to the lien of the mortgage, and constitute a part of the
security for the mortgage debt."9 " The court noted that the general rule did not apply in Easterlingbecause the mortgagee consented to an agreement between the mortgagor and his licensee
to remove an after-acquired building from the mortgaged land in
the event of foreclosure. The lack of any similar consent, notice,
or agreement in McElveen was fatal to Smith's claim to the
building9 6
The supreme court's analysis of Easterlingmay have been
somewhat superficial. Rather than premising its decision solely
upon a finding that the mortgagee consented to the third party
agreement, as suggested by the McElveen opinion, the Easterling court also considered two factors as significant. First, the
licensee in Easterlingplaced the building on the land with intent to remove it in the event of foreclosure. Second, removal of
the building did not impair the mortgage security. The combination of these circumstances precluded application of the general
97

rule.

Easterlingthus does not mandate application of the general
rule in McElveen upon the sole finding that the mortgagor did
not consent to the third-party agreement.9s Smith's intent to re-

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 107-08, 111.
277 S.C. at 416, 289 S.E.2d at 153.
217 S.C. 267, 60 S.E.2d 595 (1950).
95. 277 S.C. at 415, 289 S.E.2d at 152-53 (quoting Gilbert v. Easterling, 217 S.C. 267,
273, 60 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1950)).
96. 277 S.C. at 416, 289 S.E.2d at 153.
97. 217 S.C. at 276, 60 S.E.2d at 599.
98. See also Carroll v. Britt, 227 S.C. 9, 86 S.E.2d 612 (1955)(quoting 22 AM. Jur.
Fixtures § 63 (1939))("Whether or not a building erected on lands is a fixture depends,
as in other cases generally, upon the mode of attachment or annexation, the character of
the structure, the intention of the person making the annexation, and the relationship of
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tain title to the building and to remove it if the purchase price
was not paid is evident in his agreement with Brunson."9 Furthermore, the trial court heard evidence regarding Smith's ability to remove the building without physically impairing the
land. 100 This evidence could provide some basis for determining
whether removal would impair the mortgage security. A more
thorough evaluation of these facts in McElveen similar to that
undertaken in Easterling could have resulted in a different
conclusion.
Two lines of authority exist on the issue of whether a conditional vendor of an object attached to the land prevails over a
prior mortgagee when both claim the right to the object. The
minority rule, which South Carolina law recognizes, grants priority to the prior mortgagee on the theory that the mortgagee
holds a lien on the land by a legal title and, therefore, is entitled
to any additions that become a part of the land.'01 The rule is
based on the reasoning that the mortgagor cannot give a third
party the right to anything attached to the land which, as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, would become part of
the realty.'02 Jurisdictions that adhere to this rule have attached
no significance to the possibility of removal of the object without
damage to the property. By ignoring this factor, however, the
courts also ignore the possibility of windfalls to the mortgagee.' 03
The majority rule, known as the New Jersey rule, grants
priority to the conditional vendor if removal of the attached ob-

the parties.") Accord Creative Displays, Inc. v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 272 S.C
68, 248 S.E.2d 916 (1978); City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball
Club, 205 S.C. 495, 32 S.E.2d 777 (1945); De Laine v. Alderman, 31 S.C. 267, 9 S.E. 950
(1889).
99. Record at 12.
100. Id. at 68-71, 74-75. The building was a preengineered, prefabricated metal-wall
structure, 25' x 80', anchored by bolts to a concrete slab. Id. at 83-84. It contained electrical wiring and plumbing and was connected to a septic line and tank. Id. at 43-44.
101. Des Moines Imp. Co. v. Holland Furnace Co., 204 Iowa 274, 212 N.W. 551
(1927); Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860); Gaunt v. Allen-Lane Co., 128 Me.
41, 145 A. 255 (1929); Heath v. Haile, 45 S.C. 642, 24 S.E. 300 (1896).
102. Clary v Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522, 525 (1860) (after-acquired fixtures are
said to "feed" the mortgage by accession); Tifft v. Horton, 53 N.Y. 377 (1873).
103. Some courts, including the South Carolina Supreme Court in Easterling,avoid
this result by asserting the objects are not fixtures or finding other reasons to circumvent
the rule. See, e.g., Medford Trust Co. v. Priggen Steel Garage Co., 273 Mass. 349, 174
N.E. 126 (1930)(sheet metal garages erected on concrete pillars and floors found not to
be fixtures).
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ject will not materially injure the property.1 This approach is
premised on the notion that it is fair to allow the conditional
vendor to remove the object if doing so will not impair the original security upon which the mortgagee relied in making his
loan.10 5 Some courts reason that the conditional sales contract
prevents the object from becoming part of the realty, 10 6 while
others contend that the agreement simply gives the vendor the

right to remove

1
it. 07

Under either rule the use of legal terminology-"fixture,"
"improvement," or "title"-obscures the basic policy question
intrinsic to these cases: whether a prior lender's claim should
take priority over a later lender's claim with respect to value added by the later lender. Resolution of this issue requires reasoned consideration of the aggregate facts and circumstances
that give rise to conflicting claims.
The supreme court applied a general rule in McElveen and
resolved the priority issue merely on the basis of the chronological attachment of the encumbrances. McElveen thus dictates
that a conditional vendor acquire the real estate mortgagee's
consent prior to the attachment of an object to the property,
irrespective of the existence of other circumstances that could
arguably obviate the need for such consent.
Steven M. Rudisill
IV.

TENANT IN POSSESSION ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING
LESSOR'S TITLE

In Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc.,10° the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a tenant was estopped from attacking the title of a landlord so long as the tenant was in possession of the leased premises. The court ordered the tenant to
vacate the premises and pay the landlord the fair rental value
for the time spent in wrongful possession. In this opinion, the
104. Campbell v. Roddy, 42 N.J. Eq. 244, 14 A. 279 (1888). If the detachment would
result in some damage to the land, "the depreciation must first be made whole to the
real estate mortgagee before the chattel mortgagee can be recognized." Id. at 252, 14 A.
.at 284.
105. Id. at 251, 14 A. at 283.
106. E.g., Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 A. 641 (1929).
107. Eg., Town of Camden v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 204 Ala. 112, 86 So. 8 (1920).
108. 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982).
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court continues to follow the majority rule.
The dispute arose when Gray Line, a tour and charter boat
business, refused to vacate or pay rent on a dock and water lot
after expiration of a written lease with its landlord, 109 an unincorporated association. Two members of the association brought
a class action ' against Gray Line to recover possession and
rent. Gray Line maintained that the association was not entitled
to relief because its title was flawed. 1
12
A master in equity made the initial finding of estoppel.
The trial court adopted the Master's Report including the order
that the tenant vacate and pay double the fair rental value for
the time of wrongful possession.113 The supreme court affirmed
the order to vacate,

14

but reduced the amount that the tenant

owed to fair rental value.11 5
The supreme court reasoned that a landlord-tenant relationship had existed between the parties since 1934, mandating
application of the rule that "a tenant is estopped from attacking
the title of the landlord so long as the tenant is in possession of
" which
the premises."118 The court relied on Frady v. Ivester, 17
held that a tenant's claim to possession under a lease is
subordinate to that of the landlord; the tenant must surrender
possession if he wishes to contest the landlord's title. 1 8
The court then reduced the award to double the fair rental
value.11 9 The court reasoned that while such an amount is recoverable under section 27-35-170 of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina,12 0 that statute is penal, and a landlord must plead it to

109. Id. at 449, 289 S.E.2d at 405.
110. Id., 289 S.E.2d at 405. The complaint alleged a class of property owners claiming ownership in common. Record at 7.
111. 277 S.C. at 449, 289 S.E.2d at 405. Gray Line contended that title was vested in
the state because the landlord lacked a provable proprietary grant. Id. at 450, 289 S.E.2d
at 406.
112. Record at 27.
113. 277 S.C. at 450, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
114. Id., 289 S.E.2d at 405.
115. Id. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
116. Id. at 450, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
117. 118 S.C. 195, 110 S.E. 135 (1921).
118. 277 S.C. at 450, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
119. Id., 289 S.E.2d at 406.
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-170 (1976). The statute's operation is not restricted to
disputes in which the holdover tenant- is in wrongful possession for a period of at least
two years, as the court's opinion implies. 277 S.C. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406. The court
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recover the escalated sum. 12 1 Since the plaintiffs did not plead
the statute, the court modified the award to the fair rental
2
value.

12

In landlord-tenant title disputes, a majority of jurisdictions,1 23 including South Carolina, 124 have repeatedly applied the
estoppel rule. This decision, however, does break almost eighty
years of silence by the South Carolina Supreme Court on the
penalty statute12 5 with a concise analysis of its applicability.
Many states have similar statutes,1 26 and it is now clear that the
South Carolina court strictly interprets the provision: the statute is penal and for recovery of the escalated sum, the landlord
must plead the statute.1 27 While some states reserve the penalty
for willful holdovers,'128 South Carolina does not make that
distinction.
When the penalty statute is not pled, the court follows the
practice in most states1 29 of awarding the landlord the fair rental
value for the holdover period. 30 South Carolina provides for this
recovery by statute.' 3 ' In contrast to the penalty statute, howapparently adopted the master's language, and the master was combining the statutory
language with Gray Line's actual two year holdover. Record at 42.
121. 277 S.C. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
122. Id. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
123. E.g., Amberger and Wohlfarth, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 300 A.2d 460 (D.C.
App. 1973); Freed v. Young, 21 IlM.App. 3d 64, 315 N.E.2d 72 (1974); Kentucky-West
Virginia Gas Co. v. Browning, 521 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1975).
124. Calhoun v. Currie, 173 S.C. 429, 176 S.E. 324 (1934); Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, 127 S.C. 451, 121 S.E. 374 (1924); Frady v. Ivester, 118 S.C. 195, 110 S.E. 135
(1921).
125. The court last interpreted this statute in Newton v. Odom, 67 S.C. 1, 45 S.E.
105 (1903).
126. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.06 (West 1976)(double the rental value for tenants
holding over after giving notice and for willful holdovers); Miss. CoD ANN. § 89-7-25
(1972)(double the rent).
127. 277 S.C. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406.
128. E.g., Lesser-Goldman Cotton Co. v. Fletcher, 153 Ark. 17, 239 S.W. 742 (1922);
Moore v. Kuljis, 207 So.2d 604 (Miss. 1967).
129. E.g., Lonergan v. Connecticut Foot Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122, 357 A.2d 910
(1975)(reasonable rental and fair rental value used interchangeably); Nelson v. Growers
Ford Tractor Co., 282 So. 2d 664 (Fla.App. 1973)(reasonable rental value); Tuteur v. P.
& F. Enterprises, Inc., 21 Ohio App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970)(reasonable value of
the use and occupation).
130. 277 S.C. at 451, 289 S.E.2d at 406-07.
131. S.C. Coon ANN. § 27-35-40 (1976)(reasonable rental for the use and occupation). For application of this statute, see Gheen v. Gheen, 276 S.C. 404, 279 S.E.2d 361
(1981); Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971).
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ever, the landlord apparently need not plead the fair rental
value statute specifically; he may merely pay, as did the plaintiffs in Lund,13 2 for such rent as the court believes the landlord
is entitled.
Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc. reiterates the rule
that a tenant in possession of the premises is estopped from attacking a landlord's title. It further warns landlords that fair
rental value alone will be awarded in holdover situations unless
the penalty statute is specifically pled.
D'Anne Haydel
V.

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS EXTENDED TO NONDWELLING

HOUSE IMPROVEMENTS

In Brown v. Sandwood Development Corp.,"3 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held a vendor-subdivider of real property subject to tort liability for an alleged breach of an implied
warranty of fitness arising from the construction of non-dwelling
house improvements. While a majority of jurisdictions recognize
an implied warranty of fitness in sales of real property,13 4 South
Carolina appears to be the first to extend the warranty to nondwelling house improvements.13 5 Brown also provides a basis for
tort actions arising from the breach of that contractual duty.
The defendant, Sandwood Development Corporation, was
the original vendor-subdivider of a housing development. In this
capacity, it sold a number of lots"s" located around a pond upon
which a dam and spillway were located. In 1976 the dam collapsed causing property damage to those who owned lots around
the pond. In 1977 several of these property owners brought a
tort action against Sandwood, alleging negligent construction of
132. Record at 10.
133. 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
134. See Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313 (1971); Crawley v. Terhune,
437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1978);
Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:New Implications,New Applications, 8
REAL EST. L.J. 291, 303-06 (1908).
135. See, e.g., Hannavan v. Dye, 4 IM.App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Tibbs v.
National Homes Construction Corp., 6 Ohio App. 3d 300, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977); Tavares v. Hastman, 547 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
136. The defendant sold property directly to only six of the plaintiffs. 277 S.C. at
583, 291 S.E.2d at 376. The other plaintiffs bought property in the development from
third parties. Brief for Respondent Sandwood Development Corp. at 18.
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the spillway. 1 37 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
for an involuntary nonsuit with prejudice."" 8 The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a full trial
on the merits. 39
On appeal, the supreme court held that the doctrine of caveat emptor 40 did not apply to the transactions between the

homeowners and Sandwood Development Corporation.1 4 The
court characterized the dam and spillway as improved realty. An
implied warranty of fitness thus arose from the sale to the plaintiffs of the dam, spillway, and pond. Given this implied warranty
of fitness, the court concluded that caveat venditor 1 2 rather
than caveat emptor was applicable and remanded the case for a

trial of the plaintiffs' tort claim.

43

The supreme court in Brown relied upon its earlier application of the implied warranty of fitness in Lane v. Trenholm
Building Company.'" In Lane, the court extended the implied
warranty of fitness 45 to include nonbuilder vendors of real property such as the defendant in Brown. Until Brown, however, the
implied warranty in South Carolina only covered dwelling
houses. 46
With Brown, the definition of improved realty to which the
implied warranty attaches has been extended to include non-

137. 277 S.C. at 583, 291 S.E.2d at 376.
138. Record at 2. The trial court found: (1) that the statute of limitations barred
recovery, (2) that the evidence of negligence was insufficient, (3) that the plaintiffs were
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failure to inspect the dam and spillway,
and (4) that the doctrine of caveat emptor precluded an action for negligence against the
defendant. 277 S.C. at 584, 291 S.E.2d at 376-77.
139. 277 S.C. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 377.
140. "Let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
141. 277 S.C. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 377. The court also (1) applied the discovery rule
whereby the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of the defect, (2)
found the plaintiffs' evidence sufficient to warrant a full trial on the merits, and (3) held
that the trial judge erred in finding the plaintiffs contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. Id., 291 S.E.2d at 376-77.
142. "Let the seller beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
143. 277 S.C. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 376-77.
144. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
145. The implied warranty of fitness in real estate was first recognized in South
Carolina in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). For a general
discussion of the theory of implied warranty in South Carolina, see Contracts,Annual
Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. REv. 33, 37-39 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976);
Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
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dwelling house structures with latent defects. 4 7 This extension
is consistent with the reasoning behind South Carolina's recognition of the implied warranty of fitness as expressed in Rutledge
v. Dodenhoff.148 There, the court acknowledged the difficulty
that the average home buyer faces in making a knowledgeable
inspection of a new home and the fact that the new home buyer
is forced to rely on the builder's expertise. 49 This rationale appears equally applicable to the sale of a dam and spillway which
presents the prospective buyer with similar problems of inspection and defect detection.
The court in Brown also cited Rogers v. Scyphers1 50 as support for its application of an implied warranty of fitness. 151 In
Rogers, the court recognized three theories under which a purchaser could recover against a builder-vendor for damages
caused by construction defects in a house: (1) implied warranty,
(2) a dangerous condition caused by negligent construction, and
(3) failure to disclose a known construction defect.1 52 The plain-

tiff in Rogers did not assert an implied warranty, but prevailed
on the basis of the remaining two theories. 53 The Brown court,
however, apparently relying on the dicta of Rogers,1 " invoked
the contractual doctrine of implied warranty 155 to allow the
plaintiffs' tort action to proceed.
The use of a contractual doctrine as the basis for tort recovery in Brown represents a step toward a change in the law of
South Carolina. In Sheppard v. Nienow,158 the court held that a
plaintiff could not recover in negligence for the breach of a contractual duty.1 5 7 Brown appears to abandon the strict dichotomy

between actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto, at least

147. It appears that the rule of caveat emptor now remains in force only for the sale
of raw, unimproved real property. See, e.g., Jackson v. River Pines, Inc., 276 S.C. 29, 274
S.E.2d 912 (1981).
148. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
149. Id. at 413-14, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
150. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
151. 277 S.C. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 377.
152. 251 S.C. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
153. Id. at 134-37, 161 S.E.2d at 83-85.
154. Id. at 133-34, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
155. "[A] warranty is a contract either express or implied." Hoover v. Utah Nursery
Co., 79 Utah 12, 20, 7 P.2d 270, 274 (1932).
156. 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970).
157. Id. at 49, 173 S.E.2d at 345.
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when recovery for property damage is sought.
Brown v. Sandwood Development Corp. demonstrates an
apparent willingness on the part of the supreme court to invoke
a contractual principle to allow tort recovery. This decision
should serve to warn vendors of improved realty that they are
now subject to tort liability for the breach of an implied warranty of fitness for all improvements to real property.
M.M. Weinberg, III
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